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ABSTRACT 
This article provides an historical overview on the development of Chinese money and 
monetary regimes between about 1800 and 1950. It develops a simple conceptual framework 
based on the relative costs of assessing the inherent value of the currencies of different 
denomination. Based on this framework, I develop a historical narrative that ties important 
political and institutional changes with the evolving structural changes in the Chinese monetary 
regime marked by the vicissitudes in the use of copper, silver currencies and paper money in 
both the private and public financial sectors from the Opium War in mid-19th century to the end 
of the Civil War in the 1950s.  
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Introduction 
In 1889, a Westerner made the following comment on the Chinese currency system: 
“…Its (the Chinese currency’s) chaotic eccentricities would drive any occidental nation to 
madness in a single generation, or more probably such gigantic evils would speedily work their 
own cure. In speaking of the disregard of accuracy we have mentioned a few of the more 
prominent annoyances. One hundred cash are not 100, and 1,000 cash are not 1,000, but 
some other and totally uncertain number, to be ascertained only by experience. In wide regions 
of the Empire 1 cash counts for 2, that is, it does so in numbers above 20, so that when one 
hears that he is to be paid 500 cash he understands that he will receive 250 pieces, less the 
local abatement, which perpetually shifts in different places. There is a constant inter-mixture of 
small or spurious cash, leading to inevitable disputes between dealers in any commodity…” 
(quoted in Kann 1927, pp. 415-6).   
Notwithstanding the somewhat prejudicial and exaggerated tone, the statement 
nonetheless conveys facts closer to reality on the ground. These so-called “chaotic 
eccentricities” were in fact the shadow of what was meant to be a bimetallic system where one 
tael (or liang) of un-minted silver ingot was set equal to one thousand copper cash exclusively 
minted by China’s monetary authority2. In reality, however, silver ingots even standardized by 
weight varied in shapes, purity, fineness, and in the end the tael as a unit of account varied by 
regions and lines of trades. The situation with copper cash fared no better or even worse. The 
standard copper cash (Zhiqian) as minted by the government was by design a currency by count 
rather than by weight. But being bulky and low in value as individual pieces, copper cash usually 
of 1000 pieces were strung together to form a unit of account often referred to as a tiao or 
chuan. But the tiao as a unit varied again by regions or trades. While the number of cash strung 
in each tiao usually ranged between 900 and 1000 in most places, they could be as low as 150 
in some regions of the empire. The unit was further confounded by the widespread use of cash 
of varying qualities or simply private or counterfeited coins intermixed with the standard ones 
(see Frank King 1965, Zhang 1925).  
A third dimension to this bimetallic system was the concurrent use of silver dollars 
mostly imported from Spanish America. Here again, the spread and popularity of Spanish silver 
dollars varied by regions with greater penetration in the southern and coastal regions connected 
with the trade routes of global commodities such as silk, tea or opium. High quality silver dollars 
such as the Carlos pesos commanded superior reputation and a significant premium over their 
                                                
2 One tael or liang of silver was roughly equal to 37 grams of silver.  
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market value in silver.  But still, the value of Spanish silver dollars as a medium of exchange 
often relied on additional chops by local silver assayers as stamps of approval for local 
circulation. Except for some major trading ports, the presence of silver dollars was negligible in 
Northern China or the Hinterland.   
To satisfy the need for a common unit of account within this perplexing amalgam of 
currencies, or mixtures of currencies, with exchange rates constantly shifting across time and 
space (for disparate as well as overlapping regions), imaginary units of account emerged for 
various trading zones or guilds in China. These imaginary units, mostly denoted in silver taels 
but sometimes in copper cash or silver dollars, were usually defined by a set of physical 
characteristics such as the purity, fineness, weight or even shape of the metallic ingots. As these 
imaginary units often bore no equivalence to any actual currencies circulated in the market, 
they provided a reliable anchor against which the value of the amalgam of currencies could be 
ascertained and converted often through professional assayers or money exchangers. 
The most prominent cases of imaginary units were, not surprisingly, connected with the 
empire-wide fiscal system. The Kuping tael was a standard unit of silver used for all taxes 
collected by the central government in Beijing.3 But even here, the government dictated the 
terms of transaction in its favour by making the Kuping tael unit used for receiving tax revenue 
slightly larger than that used for paying out expenses.  The Kuping tael unit in imperial Beijing 
varied from those used in provinces and counties which furthered differed among themselves 
(Zhang 1925, p.55-60). Other than these imaginary units connected with national taxation, 
imaginary units of account for regional and local markets proliferated across the empire, 
numbering into the hundreds in the early 20th century (Dai 2007, chapter 3). All this means that, 
depending on supply and demand, there existed a nearly infinite set of cross exchange rates 
among the imaginary units, between the imaginary units and actual currencies, and among the 
actual currencies (see Frank King 1965, Kaan 1927, Kuroda 2005 for details). Indeed, as 
poignantly demonstrated by Morse (1910), a single remittance of fiscal revenue from Jiangsu 
province to Gangsu province via Shanghai could altogether entail nine different conversions of 
exchanges in different silver units, imaginary and real (Vol. 1, p.29). 
 
 
                                                
3 Other tael units connected with government taxation are Chao ping for grain tribute, see Zhang 1925, 
p. 67. After the mid-19th century, a new imaginary silver tael unit called the Haikwan tael emerged as a 
standard for customs tax payment for the Maritime Customs, see later in the text.  
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A Conceptual Framework 
This Chinese monetary system that characterized the entire 18th-19th centuries and the 
first two decades of the 20th century defies easy conceptualization within existing models of 
monetary systems. One simple analogy is to liken it to the Medieval European system where 
multiple currencies and exchange rates proliferated and straddled across a multitude of 
territories and jurisdiction. The analogy is both useful and misleading as modern China and 
Medieval Europe shared as many commonalities as contrasts. Indeed, as with any monetary and 
financial system, political institutions exerted overriding influence, which is where the Europe-
China divergence is most sharply distinguishable.   
Being a centralized and unitary empire, the Qing China (1644-1911) had a single 
national minting authority in charge of the production of standardized copper cash. There were 
provincial mints besides the imperial mints centred in Beijing but they were all regulated in 
terms of minting standard for copper cash. The bulky and small-denomination nature of copper 
cash relegated it mostly to small and local retail transactions. Like Europe before the emergence 
of gold standard, the use of multiple metal-based currencies helped solve the “big problem of 
small change” in China, with silver acting as the medium for large transactions or long-distance 
trade and copper cash as small change. But here again the second distinguishing feature of 
what some referred to as a flexible bimetallic system stood out as the larger unit of account in 
this metallic mix, silver, was not coined or minted by the Qing authority until about the end of 
the 19th century. To understand the Chinese monetary regime, I propose a simple historical 
framework based on the interaction of politics and geography in the unique Chinese context.   
One great advantage of minted or coined currencies over (un-minted) metallic ingots is 
that coins reduce the transaction costs of having to constantly assess the inherent metallic value 
or worth of each piece of metal used in each exchange. But this saving in transaction cost of 
constantly assessing currency at each exchange concurrently raises the vulnerability of that 
currency to manipulation either through debasement by the minting authority or counterfeiting 
by the private sector. Alternatively put, constant assessment of currency, while driving up the 
transaction costs, also acts as a safeguard against possible tempering of currencies motivated by 
seigniorage profits.  
There existed differentials in relative costs and benefits between large and small 
denomination currencies: the marginal (or variable) cost of assaying metallic ingots at each 
transaction for a large-denomination currency would be relatively small whereas the capital loss 
to holders of large-denomination currency (or capital gains to minting authority) due to 
tempering with minting standards would be relatively large in comparison with those for small-
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denomination currency. Hence, holding everything else constant, the relative benefits of 
assessing the intrinsic value of large denomination currency outweigh those for small-
denomination currency.  This may explain the circulation of silver in the form of ingots, whose 
high intrinsic value (sometimes even in the case of foreign silver coins) needed assessment for 
each transaction or for different localities, whereas the low denomination copper cash or even 
their counterfeits circulated in the form of countable currency, which served the very useful 
function of a medium of exchange for small transactions but with a value (per cash) too low to 
justify the cost of constant assessment.4 
The rise and fall of paper notes as a currency in Chinese history would serve as a fine 
illustration of the problem of politics in the management of large-denomination currency.  The 
potential of printed paper to become a monetary instrument of (infinitely) large denomination 
was a constant lure to any political authority with enough administrative and coercive capacity. 
The Chinese empire, endowed with a relatively advanced degree of centralization and 
absolutism, had long experimented with the large-scale use of paper notes as fiat money in the 
Song (960-1279 AD), Yuan (1286-1368) and early Ming (1368-1644) eras.  But the 
governmental desire for seigniorage revenue (often prompted by fiscal crises induced by 
invasions and rebellion) had invariably resulted in over-issuance of paper notes, leading to high 
inflation or hyperinflation throughout history.  These sustained historical episodes of currency 
tempering driven by fiscal motives severely damaged the reputation of paper money, the 
issuance of which was often viewed as a bad omen of dynastic collapse (see Lien-sheng Yang). 
Indeed, the early Ming attempts to force paper notes through the private sector only ended up 
reducing a large section of the Chinese economy to barter exchange and self-sufficiency.  It was 
partly due to this “currency” vacuum that Japanese and Spanish silver found their entry into 
China during the 17-19th century. Through the well-known Single-Whip fiscal reform in the late 
16th century, even the Ming imperial treasury itself recognized the benefit of adopting un-
minted silver ingot, the Kuping tael, as the monetary standard for tax collection, due to the 
inherent stability of an imaginary unit.  
The second complicating factor for China’s monetary system was geography: that is, 
China’s sheer size. The imperial mandate of a uniform currency matched poorly with the 
immense local variation resulting from China’s giant size and geographic distance. The unitary 
and centralized political system also precluded the rise of local autonomous jurisdiction with 
                                                
4 This is another side of the argument of the “big problem of small change” advanced by Oliver Volckart 
for explaining the stability of gold currency (the large-denomination) relative to silver (the small 
denomination) in Medieval Europe (Volckart 2008). 
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political and legislative power to mint or regulate local money. What emerged to fill (albeit 
imperfectly) this jurisdictional vacuum across a vast and diverse empire were private rules and 
customs often generated through guilds or local traditions. The informal nature of these groups 
and networks and the absence of any overarching or coordinating authority explain the 
proliferation of currencies or units of currencies, imaginary or real. The result of this complex 
and unique interaction was a monetary system that perched on a nexus of contradictions that 
simultaneously harboured both uniformity and diversity, centralization and localization, 
governmental heavy-hand and laissez-faire, openness and insularity. Evidently, the lack of a 
clearly defined unit of account and a stable minting standard reflected both the arbitrary nature 
and limited reach of an absolutist political regime, and in turn, imposed high transaction costs 
on market exchanges across a vast empire. However, as we will see, these transaction costs may 
have been a price worth paying in view of imperial China’s historical record of low credibility in 
managing currencies of large-denomination. Below I trace the evolution of this system from 
roughly 1800 to 1950.   
 
1800-1850 
The often touted glorious reign of Kangxi and Qianlong of the 18th century corresponded 
to a century of relative political peace, economic prosperity, population growth, fiscal stability, 
and most importantly, “cheap silver.” In fact, if any difficulty was encountered in the monetary 
affairs of that century, it was Imperial Beijing’s struggle to ensure a steady and reliable supply of 
copper cash to prevent the copper cash/silver tael exchange rate from drifting too far below the 
ideal rate of 1000. 
The tide, however, began to turn from the end of 18th century when the value of silver 
trended upward, reaching by the mid-19th century above 2000 copper cash/tael (see Lin 2006). 
Traditional historiography or nationalism-fuelled populist sentiment had pointed to the alarming 
level of opium imports in the early 19th century as the main culprit for the balance of payments 
deficit and the associated silver outflow from China. An in-depth look, however, reveals a far 
more complex picture on this age of “expensive” silver. Indeed, the collapse of the Spanish 
American empire around 1820, which led to major disruptions in supply of silver and high 
quality silver coins, may have just as much do with silver appreciation in China as the opium 
inflow. It may also be possible that the high quality of Carlos III silver dollars had so deeply 
penetrated into the trading networks in China’s Southeast coast and carried such a premium 
that silver ingots were drained from other parts of China to overseas to be shipped back as 
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minted silver dollars (see Irigoin 2009). In this scenario, trade imbalance within the domestic 
Chinese regions also created disequilibrium in regional money supply.  
Silver appreciation had dire consequences for China’s fiscal system denominated in silver 
tael. One natural solution to this silver-induced monetary contraction would have been for 
China to demonetize silver, a proposition hotly debated among bureaucrats and scholars of the 
time. But such a monetary reform would require intellectual and administrative capacity beyond 
the confines a traditional empire such as the Qing in the mid-19th century (see Peng 1965/2007, 
pp.678-688, Lin 2006). The path that Qing took by banning opium imports led to a direct 
confrontation with Britain. China’s fateful defeat in the so-called Opium War of 1842 heralded 
an historical turning point when China was forcibly opened to Western Imperialism.  
 
1850-1911 
The devastating Taiping rebellion in 1850-60 triggered a major fiscal crisis in Central 
Beijing. The Manchu ruler’s desperate scramble for revenue led to the so-called Xianfeng 
inflation (during the reign of Xianfeng emperor in 1850-61) generated by the government’s 
massive debasement of copper cash and issuance of inconvertible paper notes.  The process 
under which the Xianfeng inflation unfolded revealed as much about Qing’s capacity to coerce 
as the constraint in her monetary management. With minting limited to copper cash only, 
Qing’s debasement of copper cash was implemented in 1853 by the issuance of the so-called 
“big cash,” a larger and heavier form of copper cash (often referred to as “big cash” in the 
market). For example, currency with intrinsic copper content equivalent to only two copper cash 
in the original mint would receive a stamped value equivalent to ten. Inconvertible paper notes 
were also issued and pushed through the market with the full coercive power of the state. 
These policies led to immediate market reaction that, upon rumour, caused closure of money 
shops and capital flight out of Beijing. Public distrust worsened when in the end, even the 
governmental agency refused “big cash” as payment (see King 1965, Peng 1965/2007 for 
details).  
In a few years’ time, both “big cash” and government paper notes suffered steep 
discounts, with “big cash” trading at a value equivalent to its intrinsic copper content. Both 
currencies proved to be short-lived, with their coinage ended within three or four years from its 
start. In Beijing, this simply translated into a permanent nominal adjustment in the units of 
accounts with a one-time jump of five fold in the nominal price level based on “big cash” units. 
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The inflationary policy of copper debasement and the issuance of inconvertible paper notes 
were also largely confined to the capital region and the immediate neighbouring provinces due 
to Qing’s limited political control at the time of Taiping Rebellion (see Peng 1965/2007, pp. 
613-623). This new differential between the “big cash” unit in the Beijing region and other 
regional currency units added further confusions to cross-regional trade during the Post-Taiping 
Rebellion era.5  
The opening of China and the subsequent establishment of various treaty ports along 
China’s coast or main waterways were to bring fundamental and long-lasting changes to the 
Chinese monetary and banking system through the establishments of Western merchant house 
and later banks that engaged in money exchange and trade finance. Western banks such as the 
HSBC and later Japanese banks began to accept deposits and issue bank notes convertible into 
silver, which quickly found favour with the Chinese public in the treaty ports. An important 
development was the newly established administration of the Maritime Customs, which was in 
charge of collecting transit taxes for goods shipped in and out of China, as stipulated in various 
trade treaties imposed by the Western powers. A critical institutional change in the 
administration of Maritime Customs occurred at the time of the Taiping Rebellion when the 
actual management of Maritime Customs, nominally still part of the Qing governmental 
bureaucracy, fell into the hands of Westerners. Led by Robert Hart, the British Inspector General 
well-trusted by both Western mercantile interests and the Qing imperial government, the 
Maritime Customs gained great autonomy as a highly efficient and transparent agency of 
revenue collection. The tax revenue collected by the Customs were often earmarked as 
collateral for Qing and later Republican governments’ public debt subscribed by foreign banks 
as well as the open market. 
Associated with the Maritime Customs is the development of Haikwan tael, an abstract 
unit of silver tael that became the nationwide standard unit of account for Customs tax. In 
contrast to the traditional Kuping tael, whose units varied often to the advantage of imperial 
tax collectors as a source of corruption income, the Haikwan tael unit was uniform, carefully 
defined and negotiated among various treaty powers and the Chinese government. Its unit was 
on average 5 to 10 per cent larger than various tael units prevailing in different localities, as it 
deliberately excluded any extra surcharges embedded in other tael units as a form of 
                                                
5 Indeed, an imperial attempt in 1883 to restore the copper cash to original units had created chaos 
among private money shops who were willing to pay premium copper cash to call back their bank notes 
issued in “Beijing cash” units for fear of the large capital cost of having to redeem their bank notes based 
on the previous standards of copper cash. See Shao Yi, pp.183-197. 
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intermediary income for tax collection, which never reached the Central government under the 
traditional fiscal regime (see Zhang 1925, pp.60-67 and Frank King 1965 for details).  
In the latter half of the 19th century, the Qing government remained conservative and 
only engaged in limited reforms to accommodate the new political reality. Indeed, it took 
another shattering military defeat in 1894-96 by Japan for the Qing to awaken to the need for 
more fundamental change. The subsequent signing of the Sino-Japanese treaty of Shimonoseki 
in 1896, which greatly expanded the scope of foreign direct investment and strengthened the 
political control of foreign business interest in the treaty ports at the expense of China’s central 
authority, had set off two events of epochal consequence to China’s monetary and banking 
evolution.  The first was Qing’s recognition of the need to set up its own modern bank, which 
led to the incorporation of the Imperial Bank of China in 1897 (Cheng 2003, p.25). The 
founding of the Bank itself was actually far less significant than the fact that it marked the 
beginning of a vibrant era of growth of Chinese modern public and private banks, beginning in 
the 20th century. Secondly, although provincial governments and treaty port authorities started 
minting silver dollars of their own in the latter half of the 19th century, it was only by the 
beginning of the 1910s that there was a genuine imperial attempt to establish a silver standard 
and mint a national silver dollar (Wei 1955, p. 119-136).  These epochal changes in imperial 
ideology regarding the Chinese monetary regime took unexpected turns in the 20th century 
following the collapse of the Qing government in 1911.  
 
1911-1930 
The devolution of central authority in Beijing to Chinese regional warlords, colonial 
authorities at various treaty ports, or concession territories characterized the political reality of 
the Republican era of the 1910s and 1920s (also alternatively termed as the Warlord era).  With 
political disintegration came jurisdictional and economic competition, leading to what D. F. 
Denzer-Speck referred to as China’s unique era of free banking. This era started with major 
attempts by the fiscally-strapped Republican government to manipulate currency for a fiscal 
purpose. In 1916, the new Republican government under the dictatorial ruler of Yuan Shikai, 
when confronted with severe fiscal shortfalls, ordered the suspension of bank note convertibility 
among the two large governmental banks, the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications 
headquartered in Beijing. As expected, the order sent shivers through major banking centres 
across China and led to bank runs and financial disruptions. However, taking advantage of the 
extraterritorial status of the treaty port, the Shanghai branch of Bank of China, in collaboration 
12 
 
with foreign banks, succeeded in resisting the order and maintained convertibility throughout 
the crisis. 
The rising reputation of the Shanghai branch in the incident further weakened Beijing’s 
credibility and control over China’s nascent banking sector. Indeed, under the leadership of the 
Shanghai bankers, both the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications went through a 
process of semi-privatization that significantly reduced their ties with the government and 
transferred control of these banks largely to the hands of private shareholders. The International 
Settlement area of Shanghai emerged as China’s financial centre. The 1920s marked the so-
called “Golden Age” of Chinese modern banks. The total capital of Chinese banks, as 
calculated by Cheng Lin-shen, rose by nearly five-fold between 1911 and 1926 (p.71). They out-
competed foreign banks such that by 1936 their share of total banking capital (defined as the 
sum of notes, deposits and equity capital) in China was 81 per cent, compared to 11% for 
foreign banks and 9% for traditional native banks (Cheng, p. 78).  
The growth of modern Chinese banks led to important changes to the Chinese 
monetary system. With regard to silver, it saw the spread and prevalence of China’s 
domestically minted silver dollars, the so-called Yuan Shikai dollar over other foreign silver 
dollars.  According to a survey in 1924, out of 960 million silver dollars in circulation, 750 
million were Yuan Shikai dollars and only 30 million were foreign dollars (Kuroda 2005, p.114). 
An intricate relationship between silver dollars and silver taels formed during this period. With 
the increasing popularity of the governmental minted silver dollars, silver taels (often denoted in 
abstract or imaginary units) increasingly acted as a form of bank reserves in major banking 
centres’. The anchor of silver tael in the form of imaginary units served as a crucial safeguard 
against the possible tempering of various forms of silver dollars or other currencies. The 
safeguard was institutionalized with the establishment of relatively independent silver assaying 
bureaus across major commercial cities in China, with Shanghai again leading the way. These 
bureaus or offices, established from the late 19th century, supported by local commercial guilds, 
banking communities, or local and regional governments, were instrumental in setting up and 
upholding the local standard of silver tael (see Dai 2007, chapter 3).   
What emerged in this era of political decentralization was a complex but relatively 
transparent national system of multiple currency standards (or currencies), which themselves 
proliferated to over one hundred nationwide (see Dai 2007, pp. 58-79). The financial section of 
a major daily newspaper for two different dates, 1911 and 1925, as cited by Tomoko 
Shiroyama, listed bilateral exchange rates of eight to ten different types in Shanghai alone, with 
their rates fluctuating between morning and afternoon of the same day (p. 24).  Proliferation of 
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standards and currencies naturally raised transaction costs for cross-regional trade, but the 
newly added features of relative transparency among these standards and exchange rates 
brought by local regulation and information dissemination also generated momentum for 
monetary and financial integration nationwide. 
Indeed, as the decades proceeded, silver dollars were gradually replacing silver taels as a 
medium of exchange even in rural areas. In agricultural trade, seasonality in the  agricultural 
harvest led to cyclical demand for cash and generated a premium for silver dollars (versus silver 
taels) at peak seasons of the marketing and distribution of agricultural cash crops.  Ma Junya’s 
research has documented in detail how a vast network of native banks throughout China 
transferred both bills and silver dollars across major trading centres to take advantage of the 
regional differentials in exchange rate (dollars versus taels) due to the varying agricultural cycles 
in China (particularly between Northern and Southern China). Silver arbitrage of this kind, 
involving mostly native banks, as well as Chinese and Foreign banks, brought needed liquidity 
to rural markets while simultaneously saving in the use of scarce silver. Overtime, with the use 
of silver dollars converging for the Yuan Shikai silver dollar, there emerged increasing calls 
towards the use of a single silver dollar standard delinked from the silver tael.  In 1933, the 
Nanjing-based Republican government, with the backing of the powerful Shanghai-based 
Chinese modern banks, officially established a single monetary standard based on the silver 
dollar (Dai 2007, p.116-7).  
The greatest transformation in China’s monetary and financial system occurred with 
respect to paper money and banking deposits, which was propelled by the rapid growth of 
modern banking, particularly Chinese banking. Rawski estimated that the share of bank notes 
and deposits in the total money supply (M1) increased from a little over a third in 1910 to over 
two thirds by 1926, with a corresponding decline in the share of silver and copper in the total 
money supply (p. 157). The growth of paper money occurred in the so-called era of “free 
banking” where private foreign and Chinese banks, as well as Chinese governmental or 
provincial banks, freely issued bank notes circulating as media of exchange. As expected in a 
system of competitive and differentiated money, reputation effects would win out over time. 
Bank notes printed by various provincial banks connected with regional warlords were prone to 
over-issue, leading to steep discounts and often to complete exit from the market. Banks 
connected with the colonial authorities of Russia and Japan fared somewhat better and gained 
wide circulation in their spheres of influence in North-eastern parts of China. Banknotes issued 
by prominent Western banks such as HSBC and  the Chartered Bank (now known as the 
Standard Chartered) carried good reputations due to their strong reserve position and ready 
14 
 
convertibility to silver reserves and circulated widely in major treaty ports and their immediate 
hinterland (see Horesh 2009). 
By the 1920s, banknotes issued by Bank of China and Bank of Communication grew by 
leaps and bounds, overshadowing the Western banks. While benefiting from the relatively 
secure and well-developed legal environment of treaty ports, the growth of banknotes also 
owed to the successful institutional development of a banknote exchange system where the 
smaller private modern banks and native banks could pledge their holding of cash reserves and 
governmental bonds in exchange for an equivalent amount of banknotes issued by these two 
Banks. This system of banknote exchange, while allowing the smaller banking institutions to 
take advantage of the reputations of large Chinese banks, contributed to the rapid diffusion of 
notes issued by these two large Chinese Banks as well as monetary convergence (See Zhang 
1925, pp.126-148 for details). As Rawski shows, by 1930, paper notes and bank deposits in 
Chinese banks had a market share of about 80 per cent. By 1936, Chinese modern banking 
reached far beyond the treaty ports with a nationwide network of branches amounting to as 
many as 526 (Rawski, p. 135-6). In many ways, the growth and integration of monetary and 
financial markets in this era of political decentralization, coupled with the rise of autonomous 
political power, seems to have replicated the bottom-up growth that occurred across a similar 
political landscape of early modern Western Europe.   
 
1930-1949 
The somewhat accidental adherence to a silver standard allowed China to eschew the 
worst effects of the Great Depression transmitted under a global Gold standard. In fact, in the 
early years of the Great Depression, the Chinese economy and exports benefited from the 
cheapening of world silver and the positive inflow of silver reserves towards China. This, 
however, was not to last long. With many countries abandoning the gold standard and the US 
subsequently promulgating the Silver Purchase Act in 1934, silver prices worldwide began to 
rise, leading to the draining of silver out of China and a deflationary contraction within China.  
The silver-based monetary crisis of the 1930s bore a striking resemblance to the specter that 
had haunted Qing China about a century before, which ended with the fateful Opium War. But 
this time, in close cooperation with the powerful banking community in Shanghai and 
strenuous negotiations with the US and UK, the Nanjing-based Republican government of 
China succeeded in the now well-known 1935 monetary reform. The reform established 
China’s first national legal tender, the so-called fabi, issued exclusively by the three largest 
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banks – namely, the Bank of China, the Bank of Communication and the Central Bank – and 
authorized by the government. By establishing the fabi as a fiat money whose convertibility no 
longer was tied to silver but instead to a basket of major world currencies at fixed exchange 
rates, China was set on a course to avert the silver-induced monetary contraction, and began to 
see positive signs of recovery in price levels, production and exports in the next two years.  
To make the fabi reform succeed, the Nanjing government instituted a set of critical 
institutional measures, which included the establishment of a Currency Reserve Board, whose 
members were composed of prominent private bankers, as well as government personnel 
(Shiroyama 2008, p.186). The government also gradually reorganized the newly established 
Central Bank to act as a lender of last resort. Through negotiation to borrow foreign reserves 
from the US and UK, and the sale of its domestic silver, the government consciously built up a 
reserve base of foreign exchange to back the long-term convertibility of the new fabi. 
Meanwhile, the government attempted to assure the public of its commitment to fiscal balance. 
The success of the 1935 monetary reform, although curtailed by Japan’s full-scale invasion in 
1937, was a powerful testimonial to the remarkable progress achieved in the Chinese monetary 
and banking system during the 1920s and 1930s. The close cooperation and consultation 
between the finance personnel of the Nationalist government, such as Kong Xiangxi and Song 
Zhiwen, and the private banking community in Shanghai marked an important departure from 
the traditional imperial governance model of top-down coercion. 6 
Japan’s full-scale invasion of China starting in 1937 gradually stripped the Nanjing 
government of its tax base and eventually drove the government to China’s relatively 
impoverished Southwestern territory, centred in the new capital of Chongqing. In a time of 
mounting fiscal crisis, the dark side of China’s past experiments with fiat money returned. For a 
fiscally-strapped Nationalist government in the midst of war, fiat money quickly turned into a 
fiscal instrument of the state. The hyper-inflation of the late 1940s spelled the end of 
Nationalist rule, followed by a massive Civil War, out of which a victorious Communist 
government emerged to create a command economy that eliminated both private markets and 
money.  After a lapse of more than three centuries, the history of paper money in China, as 
Gordon Tullock aptly termed, came full circle to end in hyperinflation (also see Young 1965 for 
the era of hyperinflation).   
                                                
6 See Shiroyama 2008 for a comprehensive and largely positive assessment of the 1935 currency reform. 
For an alternative assessment, see Brandt and Sargent 1989. Also see Friedman 1992 for a US perspective 
on the reform.  
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